To begin with, it must be
recognized that all legal travelers to-and-fro nations of intelligence interest
are subjects of inquiry by US intelligence services, principally the CIA and
FBI. However, other instruments of government security such as DEA and the
various military intelligence agencies, as well as other governmental services
that have international briefs, are also authorized to gather appropriate, and
ofttimes classified, information on activities of foreign and domestic
travelers. In fact, depending on interest in and personal ability to proceed,
all major nations, and to some degree and interest, even minor nations pursue
the same activity.
In this regard, travel to and
business negotiations with Russia by Donald Trump and his various
representatives would naturally be a matter of interest for US embassy
personnel assigned to track such contacts. Most businesses make a point of
touching base with the State Department and the in-country embassies alerting
the official instruments to their intentions. The Trump organization
followed these usual procedures. A problem arose in Moscow when the extent of
Donald Trump and his representatives’ contact with Russian political and
business personalities became infected by inadvertent involvement with Russian
undercover Intelligence officers in the course of regular business. From the
Russian standpoint, Trump was a target of opportunity as a successful
multi-billionaire American businessman with reported good political connections
within the American and other nations’ political environment. And from that
standpoint everyone was just doing their job.
When Mr. Trump became a
candidate for president in 2016, the Russian intelligence services and the
American services had to review the information that they had on him, as did
nations such as China and others more benign. The review became of more
immediate importance when Christopher Steele, a retired officer in the UK
Secret Intelligence Service, generally known by its WW2 name as MI6, was hired
to revise and enhance an anti-Trump dossier that was in preparation by an
organization financially supported by the Democratic Party.
Steele had established
what he called a “commercial intelligence firm” named “Orbis”. It is unclear
whether Orbis truly was a legitimate private firm or a cover company for MI6
activities. In any case, as a retired officer, Steele would have had to check
back with his former service to gain approval to proceed on a project that
would involve activity that might influence the U.S. election. MI6 would have
instructed Steele to clear and coordinate the matter with the FBI as it was a
US domestic security issue. MI6 liaison with the CIA would have had to be informed
as well as The Security Service (MI5), the UK domestic intelligence agency that
is the actual counterpart to the FBI. In other words a round-robin of
coordination would have occurred
As the FBI already had
information on Donald Trump as a legal traveler to Russia, and therefore an
existing interest in him, they would have been desirous of having access to
anything Steele evolved. To be clear,
this would have been the same case no matter which American
billionaire/internationalist would have been involved. Most of these high
profile personalities or their aides are interviewed pro forma regarding
anything with which they may have observed of unusual interest during their
trips to countries of strategic importance. And to the extent manpower allows,
so would have other less public businessmen. There is no requirement that these
travellers must agree to be interviewed. It’s all on a voluntary basis.
Steele, therefore, would
have had to agree to pass on his findings to the FBI who, in
turn, would be expected to
pass the “take” on to the CIA as the official liaison with any MI6-connected
activity. Whether Steele was paid by the FBI or not is irrelevant. By sharing
information on whatever he gathered and/ or created relative to Trump, Steele
was acting with the Bureau’s knowledge and thus to some degree, effective
approval. It could be argued that Steele in some manner was under the
operational guidance, even if not under control, of the FBI. Whatever the legal
niceties, the fact of the entire Steele operation had to be tightly held at the
highest levels of the FBI.
Meanwhile, an additional
individual may have been added to the Steele project in the form of another
former MI6 officer named Pablo Miller. He had been a compatriot of Steele when
the latter served in the UK Moscow Embassy. Highly decorated, Miller had been
substantially involved in the defection of Sergei Skripal when the latter was a
GRU officer and well known in intelligence circles. Skripal was arrested by the
GRU and years later exchanged in a spy swap with the UK. Information suggested
by former UK Ambassador Craig Murray indicates that Miller may have been useful
to Steele in the latter’s assignment to gain negative information on Donald
Trump from Russian sources. (Unrelated, but interesting, is the coincidence
that Miller was a resident of Salisbury where the exchange prisoner Skripal now
lived.) This circumstance suggests Miller may have been still on MI6
payroll acting as a “minder” of Skripal before the latter was poisoned and
while Miller was aiding Steele on the side. It may seem complicated to the
uninitiated, but not at all in the world of intelligence.
The collection operation
for material now known as the Steele dossier apparently became too sensitive
for the FBI case agents, and their relationship with Steele was terminated. The
decision to cease participation in the Steele project by the FBI was made after portions of the dossier development
were leaked to the press. Whether the latter situation was resolved in
consequence of Steele’s own action or the sponsoring organization, Fusion GPS,
is unclear. In any case, Steele and his coordination with high levels of the
FBI was closed down. The possibility of a compromise of the FBI-Steele
relationship had become politically too hot to continue with the relationship.
Peter Strzok, as Deputy
Chief of counterintelligence for the FBI, would have been fully knowledgeable
of the Steele relationship and the latter’s activity on the part of Fusion GPS.
In fact, Strzok may have acted as the Bureau’s case agent on this project. It
is his knowledge of the operation in all its complexity that keeps him still
employed there completely divorced from any operational responsibility in the
FBI. Clearly the Bureau finds this method of retaining Strzok as an employee
holds greater leverage legally and security-wise.
For his part, Steele and
his family - as well as Miller - live under the protection of MI6 and
appropriate authorities in undisclosed facilities. Steele has surfaced only to
respond to a defamation suit in a London court brought by a Russian businessman
who claims he was unfairly characterized by Steele in the famous dossier. The
Russian says that he intends to proceed further in the U.S. with his suit.
Meanwhile, the domestic political scene in the U.S. is littered with people on
both sides of the last election who have been or are being brought to task over
their involvement --rightly or wrongly. There are no signs that Pablo
Miller’s purported involvement in gathering information for his friend Steele
to use in the infamous dossier had anything to do with the poisoning of Skripal
and his daughter. The problem is that as one digs around, the ball of twine
unravels only to reveal another ball of twine. The funny thing is that modern-day
politicians seem to thrive on each new disclosure and/or promise of disclosure.
One wonders how history will deal with these complications. But then there’ll
just be more complications and more balls of twine.
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