There is a tendency when analyzing world affairs to view
new events in a linear fashion. As an example, when the Chinese do something it
is seen as aimed at some immediate issue. This week it is economic
advantage in tariff negotiations. In the near future it could be something to
do with political influence in Southeast Asia and access to the South China Sea.
In the same manner Russia’s attack and capture of three Ukrainian vessels in which
twenty-four Ukrainian sailors were taken prisoner has been analyzed as an
effort to challenge Ukrainian sovereignty over certain areas of eastern
Ukraine. This may be true, but it is merely part of the story.
The
larger issue is not simply Russian designs on Ukraine, but to maneuver the U.S.
and its western allies into a position that presents Moscow with an
advantageous negotiating stance on other issues including, among other things,
preventing an expansion of NATO and even more immediate Russian political
military operations in the Middle East. It is a form of chess well understood
by these traditional masters of the game. The accrual of pawns for use in
exchange for instruments of greater value is a basic technique in security
negotiations as it is in the game of chess.
These actions may be perceived as “dirty
tricks”, but in fact they are a long-standing part of international activities
of all kinds. Certainly, the Persians always were considered very talented in
this form of advanced negotiating technique and contemporary Iran has inherited
all these same skills. The recent test firing of a multi-warhead ballistic
missile is an example of the classic “show of strength” maneuver so as to
present the adversary with the potential of what could be in order to get the
opponent to negotiate a more acceptable solution. Such missile development
already had been banned. Nonetheless, even this banning plays a role in the
strategic maneuvering that is an essential part of the effort of the U.S. and
its allies in setting the parameters of Iranian political military ambitions.
On the other side, with this new weapon
in development Tehran is now in a position to bargain for greater advantage in
the backrooms of negotiation. It is easily seen that giving up this new weapon
would require an equal or greater sacrifice by the other side – in this case
the United States and others. Of course, this, in turn, can be countered by an
escalation on the part of the American-led group. However, that's not a step
the Iranians believe Washington will take. Teheran doesn't have to use its new
weapon. Its existence is enough for negotiating purposes.
A similar tactic already has been used by the North Koreans in
announcing the creation of “a new non-nuclear military device”. Most analysts
agree that this euphemistic reference relates to an advanced anti-cruise
missile capability. Of course, Russia also stated earlier that it had developed
extraordinary technology in this field. Putin himself announced this several
months before. The implication, therefore, exists that somehow the DPRK
announcement of its new capability is somehow related to the similar Russian
breakthrough. Now, that adds up to a double move very useful in negotiations.
Well done, comrades!
These technological chess moves are
quite naturally part of what opposing players would call “dirty tricks”. Perhaps it's more complicated and expensive
than past concepts of the usual covert activity, but certainly equal to - or
exceeding - past maneuvers. The Chinese have been especially apt at targeting
the “Wall Street” financial structure so as to give advantage to China's place in international finance. The
counteraction taken by the current U.S. Administration of boldly raising tariffs
took Beijing by surprise, for they expected that Washington did not have the
will to endanger its relationship with Beijing. In this they misjudged the
buccaneer style of “dealing” in which the current President was practiced –
unlike previous more traditional presidents. President Trump seemed to enjoy
the challenge. To him it was just another business deal. The Chinese have
finally figured that out. It's part of getting to know one's opponent.
It's taken a while for other leaders to
realize the American president actually prefers this type of negotiating.
Unlike the Chinese, some still don't quite view the American acceptance of
confrontation as a legitimate form of playing the game. The Chinese, on the
other hand, have used that move themselves in the past and, as is said, don't
take it personally. There is little the Chinese haven't encountered in their
history. The fact is that they, too, enjoy the game and their leader, Xi
Jinping, appears personally to be at ease with the contest.
The North Koreans are in a weaker
position and they know it. Their principal weapon is delay, delay and being
backed by the really big boys, China and Russia. The Iranians are suspicious of
everyone. This includes even their own cadre. They are good tactically, but
because of their theocratic dictatorship, poor strategically. The Russians
still can't decide whether they are a Western or Eastern nation, simply because
they really are both. It makes them easier opponents on one hand, yet a bit
confusing on the other. In the end Moscow will come down on the side of Western
pragmatism, but in the meantime be very rough in the clinches.
As different as these adversaries of the
United States may be, they all operate in the same pattern – and indeed, so do
we. It is the pattern of national contest that underpins world politics. It is
when we in the U. S. lose sight of all the elements of the contests that we get
frustrated and tend to make wrong decisions. The truth is that in this world,
there are no rules – only ploys and gambits.
Comments
Post a Comment