It
must be a very difficult job to be a Russian or Chinese intelligence officer
these days, It's not the strength of the opposition – though of course that's
always a consideration. The main reason is the lack of clear purpose. The world
- the secret world that they deal in – is much more complicated these days.
Sometimes the old enemy for these well-practiced operators is viewed
differently by the officers' own political superiors. Frankly, it must be very
hard to keep up with the changing perceptions of the leader-class who
themselves seem to be playing “outside the lines” of historical perceptions. Of
course, there is a difference between the two countries, so we will discuss
them separately. First, the Russians –
While
the Western press and novelists (often indistinguishable) remain preoccupied
with the Russian of previous decades, much has changed both in form and spirit
in the Russian security apparat. To begin with, the international charter of
what once was the KGB, now SVR-RF appears to have been shifted in the main to
the previously military-targeted and structured GRU that is now more accurately
referred to as GU. The complex world of cyber ops is now under the GU charter.
This became clear publicly with the “discovery” of attempted Russian cyber
activity during and before the 2016 US presidential election.
Interestingly,
the recent arrest of Maria Butina exposed a long-term project run by GU
involving an attempted deep cover penetration of the American political
environment through connection with the US gun rights organization NRA. The
complicated and well backstopped Russian project was surprisingly a GU activity
from it’s beginning. In the many years previous, such a project would have been
strictly a KGB First Department (First Chief Directorate) operation. Clearly
the role of the GU has been immensely broadened. It would be interesting to
know how this came about and is now in practice. Perhaps Ms. Butina will tell
us and that may explain the arrest of the mysterious Paul Whalen in Russia as a
possible “tit-for-tat”.
As
usual, the indigenous political rivalries in the Russian Federation certainly
have played a part. The GU cyber operation, run out of St. Petersburg, is
clearly a baby of Vladimir Putin as a major developmental role was played by
his personal friend, the powerful and well-connected Russian entrepreneur, Yevgeny
Prigozhin. In the same way, Russian GU-run mercenary “special operators” in
Syria gain much of their material support through the Wagner Group supply
structure, another Prigozhin-related entity. At the same time, however, there
has been a reported competitive growth of political influence among those who
seek to compete for power with the established Putin-dominated structure. In
this regard, Putin himself has appeared to have increased his own strategic-
and perhaps tactical- control over the Russian foreign intelligence apparat,
thus providing a possible explanation for the shift in operational emphasis
through the GU.
The
foregoing may seem illogical in view of Putin’s KGB background, but the Russian
intelligence services have been undergoing a serious metamorphosis in the last
three decades. This circumstance may have been simply a reflection of changing
world conditions including American intervention in the Middle East. At the
same time, Chinese military, political and intelligence operations have
substantially increased in Africa and contiguous regions. Insecurity in the
Russian political environment has driven Putin and his intelligence cadre to
batten down the hatches and aggressively seek to regain the type of control
they traditionally had. Aggression against Ukraine also may have been spurred
by this newly evolved insecurity.
Meanwhile
in Beijing, the awareness of the perceived vulnerability of Putin’s Moscow
Center has been an encouragement to the development of the long-term outreach
of China’s external intelligence structure worldwide. Particular attention has
been payed, not only to the United States, but also elsewhere wherever the PRC
has an interest – political, economic or military. In the latter case, their
desire to increase their presence in the Indian Ocean has spurred their intel
involvement in East Africa and North to Djibouti where they now have a military
base. This outreach is now to be seen worldwide. From and intelligence
gathering standpoint one could say there are few places these days that do not
have some sort of PRC presence.
However,
it is the United States to which Beijing’s interest is primarily turned. Much
already has been written of China’s’ preoccupation with sending their “best and
brightest” to study in the US. It also has been well commented on that the
academic route, undergraduate to postgraduate, is a convenient method to introduce
Chinese deep cover personnel into the American scientific and technical scene,
civilian and military. What is overlooked is that this influx also offers an
excellent opportunity for American intelligence services to develop assets for
their use, not only while in the United States, but also upon their return to
China. All in all, it is generally agreed in Washington circles that the PRC
services gain far more than their US counterparts.
The
real problem for the government of Xi Jin Ping is not in the gathering of
intelligence. They have more information and analysis than can be used
effectively. The fact is that PRC political intel tends to be primarily a
reflection of what is gathered through journalistic sources, private and
published. For classified intelligence gathering they must rely on
intermediaries of other nations. While this method is useful in creating
cutouts for American recruitment, from an agent-handling standpoint it
diminishes operational control and thus direction.
Another
important problem facing PRC intelligence operations are the strong divisions
existing in the Chinese organizational structure. It may appear that Chinese
Communist leadership is highly disciplined, and to a certain extent this is
true. The reality of governance in what is now a dual economic system of state
and private enterprise has injected an operational tension that borders close
to conflict on certain issues. The much heralded relationship between Xi
Jinping and Donald Trump has in itself caused serious division of view within
Beijing’s cadre.
These
divisions of varying security import reach well into the PRC intelligence
structure. While at first glance this may appear to some in the West to be a
fortunate circumstance, the divisions tend to harden Chinese politico/military positions
that reach deeply into their foreign intelligence structure on several levels.
In other words, operating against Xi’s intel structure becomes ever more
complicated and difficult while having to fend off counter actions and at the
same time seeking to encourage asset development.
If
this all appears rather arcane, it is. To put it simply, the boys and girls in
Beijing have nearly as much trouble corralling their eager and talented intel
officers and agents as the US has in tracking and subverting them. There must
be a German intelligence term for this, but it doesn’t really matter. The fact
is the Chinese are now and always have been very hard to operate against since
the creation of the PRC. A great deal of that problem has nothing to do with
the obvious. In the end they have a great deal of difficulty in dealing with
themselves!
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