To
begin with, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is said to be one
of the most secretive nations in the world. It's not that North Korea is simply
secretive. All countries in one manner or another are secretive. The DPRK,
however, tends to be, as the 1939 quote from Winston Churchill about Russia
goes “... a mystery wrapped in an enigma”. Importantly, the leadership in
Pyongyang enjoys it that way. Of course, for centuries the dominant regime in
the northern part of the Korean peninsula was known as “The Hermit Kingdom”.
What exists today is merely a modern version of the historic past. The problem
that exists in maintaining this character for North Korea is that its
relatively young leader Kim Jong Un (age approximately 35) enjoys the
international attention - good and bad. Hardly the image of a hermit.
The
most important issue for the DPRK is its desire to be recognized as a
significant world power. This is the driving force behind Pyongyang's drive for
nuclear weapon capability. At the same time, having a nuclear weapon capability
is deemed the DPRK's ultimate defense weapon in that its potential use would
deter any aggression against their nation. Here is where Washington faces its
greatest challenge. Somehow the U.S. must create an environment whereby the
leadership in North Korea no longer views the Americans as an existential
threat. This begins with Kim Jong Un's personal sense of security.
This
then brings us to the question with which the Trump Administration, and past
presidencies, have been faced. What can be done to convince the Pyongyang
leadership that the U.S. has no desire to oust the government originated by Kim
Il Sung in 1948 now led by his grandson. The first steps by President Trump
seem to be based on the creation of a personal relationship with Kim Jong Un.
The second step obviously must be in the form of something the North would
consider a major gift. That surely would have to include – at least in part –
major shipments of desperately needed agricultural products for winter
provisioning.
The
unfortunate fact is that the DPRK has only approximately 15-18% of their country
as arable land depending on the source. The rest is all rocky mountainous
terrain. This tillable land is far less than required to sustain its
population. North Korea is a nation that must rely on importing food stuffs
from its southern brothers, China and other friendly sources. In turn the
northern portion of the Korean peninsula is rich in minerals available for sale
and trade, if the mining process can be technically developed to compete in
world markets. It is clear that this is an economy that can work if it is
administrated properly. Of this Kim Jong Un and his advisors are well aware.
However, they are so bound by the contrary nature of their political economy
they cannot and will not for the moment take advantage of the obvious potential
of less rigid military and security driven policies.
It
is said that the DPRK is a dictatorship. It is certainly true that the
Stalinist communist government constructed by Kim Il Sung was just that.
However, the leadership structure since then has evolved into something
different while at the same time retaining the essence of central control that
remains just as strong. In reality, Kim Jong Un does have the same singular
power that existed under his father and grandfather. That power, however, is
constrained by the existence of several pressure centers that have evolved over
past years. In consequence the fracturing of the command structure and the
differing personality of the prime leader has led to a broader dispersal of
power. Nonetheless, at the same time the basic structure has retained the
actual and theoretical dominance of the singular leader. Kim did agree to have
his uncle and half-brother assassinated for their roles in an attempted (or
perceived) coup. In Western terms, the DPRK power and command structure
resembles more of an old Balkan mid-level European monarchy led by an extended
family and its friends with the young Kim at its head. Appropriately, Kim Jong
Un is now officially titled, “The Great Successor”.
As
a result of the foregoing, dealing with today's Kim is in some ways more
complex than negotiating would have been under his all-powerful predecessors.
There are more constituencies to be satisfied now. In addition, Kim's health is
more a factor than his press allows to be seen. He suffers from a
glandular-related morbid obesity with all its negative health ramifications,
according to Swiss medical personnel who have treated him. The DPRK leader has
limited physical capacity to deal with the always demanding factors of
directing a modern and complex society. Delegation is therefore a physical as
well as political necessity. This is a subject never noted publicly, but well
understood by the power centers that already are competing sub rosa for
post Kim leadership.
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